

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

AECE-00 /026 W

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3774

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 16110

EXDIS

FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY.

E.O. 11652: NXGDS-3

TAGS: US, UR, PARM, OEXD

SUBJ: TTBT,/PNE NEOTIATIONS - MEETING OCTOBER 23

PNE MESSAGE NUMBER THIRTYS-ONE

REF: MOSCOW 16108

1. TEXT OF STOESELSTATEMENT AT OCTOBER 23 PLENARY
FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT. MR. MINISTER, I WANT FIRST TO RETURN TO
SOMETHING THAT I MENTIONED YESTERDAY. OUR COMMENTS,
FORMAL OR INFORMAL, ON YOUR VERIFICATION PROPOSALS AR
IN NO WAY INTENDED AS CRITICISM. IT IS OUR PURPOSE AT
THIS POINT TO UNDERSTAND YOUR IDEAS, TO EXPRESS SPECIFIC
CONCERNS THAT WE MUST ACKNOWLEDGE, AND IN TURN TO ASK
YOU TO RESPOND TO THOSE CONCERNS. THIS IS DONE ATTEN-
TIVELY WITH FULL RESPECT TO THOSE CONCERNS. THIS IS DONE ATTEN-
TIVELY WITH FULL RESPECT FOR YOUR APPROACH AND IN A
SPIRIT OF COOPERATION SO THAT WE CAN MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY
TOWARD FULFILLING OUR MUTUAL TASK IN A THOROUGH MANNER.

IN BROAD OUTLINE, WE UNDERSTAND YOUR APPROACH TO THE
SUBJECT OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES
TO FALL INTO TWO CATEGORIES. AS THE BASIS FOR AN

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AGREEMENT AS CALLED FOR UNDER ARTICLE III OF THE TTBT,

YOU PROPOSE THAT VERIFICATION OF THE PEACEFUL CHARACTER OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSION BE BASED ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, AUGMENTED, BY THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON THE PURPOSE, LOCATION, TIME AND YIELD OF THE EXPLOSION AND THE RESULTS AND ACTUAL YIELD OF THE EXPLOSION. IN ADDITION, TO AN AGREEMENT ALONG THESE LINES YOU HAVE STRESSED THAT, IN YOUR VIEW, WE SHOULD SEEK A BROAD AGREEMENT ON PNE. THE MAJOR ELEMENT WOULD BE A BROAD COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ON PNE ACTIVITIES. YOU ALSO HAVE SUGGESTED THAT COOPERATION UNDER SUCH AN AGREEMENT COULD SATISFY THE CONCERNS ABOUT VERIFICATION THAT WE HAVE STRESSED.

AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS, WE ARE IN NO POSITION TO ACCEPT OR REJECT YOUR APPROACH, EITHER IN PRINCIPLE OR IN DETAIL. OUR PURPOSE IS TO CLEARLY UNDERSTAND YOUR PROPOSALS SO THAT WE CAN FORM A JUDGEMENT, WITH YOUR HELP, ON THE DEGREE TO WHICH YOUR APPROACH MIGHT SATISFY OUR CRITERIA AND CONCERNS.

YOU HAVE STRESSED THE ELEMENT OF BROAD COOPERATION TO BE CONTAINED IN A BROAD AGREEMENT ON PNE ACTIVITIES THAT COULD MEET THE CRITERIA AND CONCERNS WHICH WE HAVE STRESSED. YOU HAVE REFERRED TO PAST US AND SOVIET UNION COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS ON THE AREA OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH SUCH AS IN THE FIELD OF CONTROLLED THERMONUCLEAR FUSION. YOU HAVE REFERRED TO US AND SOVIET UNION COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO IAEA ACTIVITIES. WHAT WE NEED FROM YOU NOW IS AN EXPRESSION OF THE FORM AND SUBSTANCE THAT COOPERATION IN PNE ACTIVITIES MIGHT TAKE. WE BELIEVE THAT AN ELUCIDATION OF YOUR VIEWS ON THIS IMPORTANT MATTER WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL TO US.

LET ME STATE AGAIN, IT IS OUR PURPOSE TO UNDERSTAND YOUR PROPOSALS; AND THAT OUR COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS ARE DIRECTED TOWARD THAT END. IN OUR EARLY REMARKS, WE PROMISED YOU CANDOR IN OUR COMMENTS. WE INTEND TO CONTINUE IN THAT MANNER, INCLUDING IN ASKING OUR

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QUESTIONS.

THIS CONCLUDES MY PREPARED STATEMENT. I WOULD NOW LIKE TO INTRODUCE DR. ROMNEY WHO WILL MAKE A STATEMENT REGARDING ASPECTS OF VERIFICATION. END QUOTE.

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2. VERBATIOM OF ROMNEY PRESENTATION FOLLOWS: QUOTE:
WE ALL UNDERSTAND THAT THERE ARE LIMITS TO THE
ACCURACY WITH WHICH THE YIELD OF AN EXPLOSION CAN BE
VERIFIED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. WE SPENT MUCH
TIME IN THIS ROOM LAST SUMMER DISCUSSING HOW TO REDUCE
THE UNCERTAINTIES IN YIELD DETERMINATION. WE CON-
CLUDED THAT WE COULD HAVE HIGHER CONFIDENCE IN OUR
YIELD ESTIMATES IF CERTAIN KINDS OF SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION WERE TO BE SUPPLIED BY THE OTHER SIDE.
THE ACTUAL VERIFICATION PROCESS WOULD CONSIST OF
COMBINING THE VARIOUS KINDS OF QUANTITATIVE AND
QUALITATIVE DATA OBTAINED BY INDEPENDENT NATIONAL
MEANS WITH INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY THE OTHER SIDE.
THE CONSISTENCY OF ALL DATA BECOMES AN IMPORTANT
ELEMENT IN THE FINAL JUDGMENT THAT MUST BE EXERCISED.

FROM THE NARROW POINT OF VIEW OF YIELD VERIFICATION,
THE PROBLEM IS VERY LITTEL DIFFERENT WHETHER THE
EXPLOSION OCCURS ON OR OFF THE TEST SITE. IN EITHER
CASE, PROCISELY TSAME TECHNICAL FACTORS LIMIT OUR
ABILITY TO DETERMINE YIELD WITH ACCURACY.

NEVERTHELESS, IT WOULD APPEAR TO BE OBVIOUS THAT WE
WOULD BOTH WANT TO APPLY OUR NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
AS ONE ELEMENT IN OUR ATTEMPTS TO VERIFY THE CLAIM OF
THE OTHER SIDE CONCERNING THE YIELD AND PURPOSE OF
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THE EXPLOSION. IF OUR INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENTS OF YIELD DIFFER GREATLY FROM THE CLAIMED YIELD, WOULDN'T THIS LEAD TO DOUBTS ABOUT THE CLAIMED PURPOSE OF THE EXPLOSION AS WELL? IT WOULD SEEM TO US THAT AN IMPORTANT QUESTION IS HOW TO OBTAIN THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NEEDED TO REDUCE THE UNCERTAINTIES IN OUR INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENTS OF YIELD AND PURPOSE OF PNES, WE WOULD APPRECIATE CLARIFICATION OF YOUR VIEWS ON THIS.

WE HAVE NOTED THAT IN YOUR DISCUSSION OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE, YOU DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN EXPLOSIONS ABOVE AND BELOW 150 KILOTONS. UNLESS WE MISUNDERSTAND, YOUR PROPOSE TO PROVIDE NO DATA ON EXPLOSIONS BELOW 150 KILOTONS, AND PERHAPS YOU EVEN REJECT THE NEED FOR VERIFICATION OF SUCH EVENTS. YET YOU ALSO RECOGNIZE THE STRONG DEPENDENCE OF SEISMIC SIGNAL AMPLITUDE ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ROCK AT THE SHOT POINT AND UPON THE DEPTH OF THE EXPLOSION. THIS APPEARS TO PRESENT US WITH A PARADOX. HOW CAN WE VERIFY THAT AN EXPLOSION CLAIMED TO BE BELOW 150 KILOTONS WAS NOT ACTUALLY SUBSTANTIALLY LARGER THAN 150 KILOTONS IF NO SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION IS EXCHANGED?

DR. SAFRONOV MENTIONED THAT EXPLOSIONS OF DOZENS OF KILOTONS IN POROUS ROCK COULD PRODUCE SEISMIC SIGNALS OF THE SAME SIZE AS A FEW KILOTONS IN HARD ROCK, AND WE AGREE WITH THIS. APPLYING THE SAME KNOWLEDGE TO LARGER YIELDS, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT EXPLOSIONS OF A FEW HUNDRED KILOTONS IN POROUS ROCK COULD GIVE SIGNALS OF THE SAME MAGNITUDE AS EXPLOSIONS BELOW THE 150 KILOTON THRESHOLD IN HARDER ROCK -- AND WE COULD NOT TELL THE DIFFERENCE BY INDEPENDENT SEISMIC MEANS ALONE.

IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF YOU WOULD COMMENT ON HOW WE CAN RESOLVE THIS PARADOX.

WE HAVE ALSO HEARD THE SOVIET VIEW THAT INFORMATION MIGHT BE EXCHANGED WHICH WOULD SOLVE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH ARRAYS OF EXPLOSIONS. BUT
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JUST WHAT THIS INFORMATION WOULD BE AND HOW IT WOULD HELP US IS NOT KNOWN TO US. FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT WOULD PREVENT THE USE OF A WEAPON TEST AS ONE OF THREE OR FOUR SIMULTANEOUS EXPLOSIONS FOR SOME CONTAINED

APPLICATION? CERTAINLY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS COULD NOT DETERMINE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SEPARATE EXPLOSIONS. EVEN IF THE YIELD OF THE WEAPON WERE TO DEVIATE FROM ITS DESIGN VALUE, ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE TOTAL YIELD WOULD BE SMALLER THAN THE EXPECTED ERROR IN YIELD BASED ON SEISMIC MEASUREMENTS.

PERHAPS YOU COULD EXPLAIN HOW, WHEN MULTIPLE EXPLOSIONS ARE EMPLOYED, SUFFICIENT INFORMATION COULD BE OBTAINED TO VERIFY THAT EACH EXPLOSION WAS PURELY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. END QUOTE.

STOESSEL: THANK YOU, CARL. ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS? DR. FLEMING HAS SOME QUESTION TO ADDRESS TO DR. MYASNIKOV.
STOESSEL

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